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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IH l.\lU> OF I~~DFCrVrlo~ OF THE 
UlL\~lT~ ~l'IIOOL DI~THlCT, a 
~tatutory <'O rpo ration, 
Pla iu tiff -Respondent, 
- vs.-
1\EX H. COX and \YIL.\llNA COX, 
his \ril\•, 
I J('fe nda 11 t . ,·-Appell ants. 
Case No. 
10023 
~T.\TI·:~LE~T OF rrHE XATL'RE OF THE CASE 
The defendants, Hex H. Cox and \Vilmina Cox, 
owned the propprty in question originally as joint 
tPnanb. 
Judgment wa:' in two parts. Fir~t, the defendants 
wert• required to eonYPY titk (their interest in) to the 
property to the plaintiff and :'P<·ondl:-, defendants were 
l'l 1 lltpl·It~ated for their intere:::t in the real p:::;tah-'. On 
defpndenh:' motion, Judgn1ent again:::t \Yihnina Cox wa~ 
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set aside, but the lower court refused to set the judg-
rnent aside as against defendant Rex H. Cox, and this 
Court affinned the order of the lower court (Case No. 
9844). Defendant Rex I-I. Cox refused to conve~· his 
interest, and on plaintiff's rnotion, the lower court, Hon-
orable Joseph G. J ep1Json, ordered the conveyance of 
the undivided one-half interest of defendant Rex H. Cox 
in the property to plaintiff and simultaneously plaintiff 
tendered to defendant's counsel its warrant for $21,000.00 
payable to Rex lL Cox to pay for his entire interest in 
the property and in the money portion of the judgment. 
This was refused and said warrant was tendered into 
court. The lmver court ordered the warrant received 
and held by the clerk of the court pending further order 
(R. 75 ). 
DISPOSITION IN LOvVER COrR~r 
After this court affirmed the lower court's action 
in refusing to set aside the judgment against defendant 
Rex II. Cox, the Plaintiff-Respondent moved the lower 
court to enter an order conveying the undivided one-half 
interest of defendant Rex H. Cox to plaintiff and of-
fered to tender into court plaintiff's warrant for $21,000 
(R. 71-7:2). Thereafter, Defendant-Appellant Rex H. Cox 
rnoved the lower court to have plaintiff pay over to 
the defendant Rex H. Cox the full amount of the money 
judgment whieh had been entered in favor of both Rex 
H. Cox and \Yihnina Cox (R. 7:-3). The lower court 
Honorable Joseph U. Jeppson granted plaintiff's motion 
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nml d•·niPd th•fpndant ·~ motion, and on October 23, 1963 
··nt••l't>d an ordPr <·onv<·ying the undivided one-half inter-
··~t of dPI'Pndnnt HPx. 11. Cox in said property to plaintiff 
nnd a<·<·PptPd plaintiff's h·nder of a warrant in the suu1 
of $:!1,000.00 payable to tlw order of defendant Rex H. 
('o\ (R. 7;J). 
l \ELIEI!, ~< > l. G llT 0 X APPEAL 
Plaintiff-Respondent seeks to have the lower court's 
onlt•r of October :2:3, 1963 affinned. 
~'l'.ATE.MENT OF FAOTS 
Uoun8t'l for the defendants, l\lr. Sagers, stated be-
fore the lower l'Ourt, "l think the property is held in 
joint h•mtnl'y, Your Honor, it would be more than a 
one-third inh•rest.'' (R. 62). The fact that the property 
was originally held in joint tenancy was verifed by the 
eertifil'd copy of the warranty deed (Exhibit P-1, R. 
;l)). The answer filed by the defendant \Vilmina Cox 
i~ X OT included in the record on appeal. 
Both defendants owned the property in question 
tmd originally as joint tenants. But as discussed here-
after l'ach dl'f'endant owned an undivided one-half inter-
l':;t in the n1oney portion of the judgment . 
..:\.ftpr this court affinned the action of the lower 
eourt in refn~ing to set aside the judg1nent against de-
ft.>ndant Rt•x H. Cox. he reftu;ed to eonYey hi8 undivided 
one-half intt'l'P~t in said property and plaintiff-respon-
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dent withdrew its warrant for $41,831.60 (R. 70), whirlt 
was payable to Rex H. Cox and \Vilmina Cox, his wift>, 
and which had previously been tendered into court under 
the original judgn1ent against both defendants. There-
after by motion dated October 8, 19'63 and filed Odoh(•J' 
10, 1963, Plaintiff-Respondent n10ved tlw lower court 
for an order conveying the undivided one-half interest 
of defendant Rex H. Cox in the property described in 
the cmnplaint to plaintiff and offered to tender its war-
rant in the su1n of $21,000.00 payable to defendant Rex 
H. Cox for his share of the judgment (R. 71-7~). 
By Inotion dated the lOth day of October, 1963, copy 
1nailed to plaintiff's attorneys October 11, 1963 and filed 
October 11, 1963, defendant Rex H. Cox moved the lower 
court for an order compelling the plaintiff to pay over 
to defendant-appellant Rex H. Cox the full amount of 
the judgment originally entered in favor of Hex H. Cox 
and Wilmina Cox, his wife (R. 73), but he could only 
convey his interest, which was an undivided one-half. 
Both n1otions were argued on October 17, 1963 and 
the lower court denied defendant's n1otion and granted 
plaintiff's 1notion and on October :23, 1963 entered an 
order conveying the undivided one-half interest of the 
defendant Hex H. Cox in said property to plaintiff. On 
October 17, 1963 plaintiff tendered into court its \\'ar-
rant 1 >a)·ahh· to Rex H. Cox in tht> sun1 of $21,000.00 
upon refusal of defendant's attorney to accept the same 
(R. 75 ). 
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... \HU UillENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S-APPELLANT'S BRIEF DOES NOT 
APPLY TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 
:--;outt- gem'ral n'marks concernnig Defendant's-
.\ptwllnnt'~ Brief appear to be in order. 
The order eomplainted of did not alter or enlarge 
the de::;eription set out in plaintiff-respondent's com-
plaint nor change the ownership or create any estate 
or interPst in the property except that the order con-
n'yed the one-half interest of defendant-appellant Rex 
H. Cox to the plaintiff-respondent who thereby became 
a tenant in common with defendant Wilmina Cox. 
~ o attack was 1nade on the judgment and the order 
complainted of 1nerely carried into effect the judgment 
rt>maining after that portion of the judgment applying 
to defendant 'Viln1ina Cox was set aside on defendant's 
motion. The admission of a certified copy of the war-
ranty deed (Exhibit P-1, R. 76), which conveyed title 
to ~uhjPd property to the defendants as joint tenants 
nwrely vPrified the correctness of the stateinent made 
by the defendanfs counsl in open court (R. 62), and 
also Vl'rified what portion of the judg1nent had been set 
aside and what re1nained to be enforced. Defendants 
admitted ownership wa:::; in both defendants and with-
out more Pvidence, it would be assun1ed to be an un-
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divided one-half interest in each defendant. It is obvious 
that Rules 59( e) and 58 (A) have no application in 
this situation. 
The entire argument of defendant-appellant in ref-
erence to direct and/ or collateral attack on a judgment 
and res judicata has no application to this case. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS EACH OWNED AN UNDIVIDED 
ONE-HALF OF THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION 
AND IN THE MONEY JUDGMENT. 
There was ample opportunity for the defendant Rex 
H. Cox to have shown that his interest in the property 
was something different than an undivided one-half if 
that were true. This he failed to do. In fact, this he 
could not do, for he is the breadwinner and the money 
he earned paid for the property. He could prove that 
his interest was more than one-half but would have 
been powerless to assert his interest was less. The 
property was originally owned in joint tenancy by de-
fendants. This was asserted hy counsel for defendants 
before the lower court in the following words: ''I think 
the ·property is held in joint tenancy, Your Honor, it 
would be 1nore than a onP-third interest." (R. fi:2). Thi~ 
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wa~ vl'rit'it•d by thP warranty deed as shown by the certi-
t'it·d ropy (~xhibit P-1, H. 76), introduced in evidence. 
Fnity of interest is one of the four unities n_•quired 
in the t'l'I'Ution of a joint tenan<'y. See 8n·artzbarugh t'. 
SriiiiJJson, ;>-+ P. ~d 73 (Cali f.) in which the court stated 
in purt as follow~: 
"For the creation of a joint tenancy, four 
unities an· n•quried, nan1ely: unity of interest, 
unity or title, unity of thne, unity of possession. 
( ea~l'~ cited) . . . " 
~~'l' also Dana v. Delaney, 125 F. ~upp. 59-1, Cnied States 
District Court, D. 1\{assachusetts; Wambeka v. Hopkin, 
::7~ P.2d 470 ( \Yyo.); In Re Whiteside's Estate, 67 N.W. 
~d 1-U (Neb.). 
1'~he question of the extent of the interest of joint 
tenants was not decided but is referred to in the case of 
Tracy-Col/ius Trust Company v. Goeltz, 5 Utah 2d 350, 
301 P.~tl. 1 OSti, in the following words: 
"The trial court ordered that the undivided 
one-half interest of the defendant Francis Boydell 
Goeltz in said property owned by him on May 10, 
19-lS ... be separately sold to satisfy the amount 
due plaintiff . " (Page 1087 and continues at 
pagp 1089); 
"Francis Boydell Goeltz was in a position to 
lawfully conYey or enctuuber the property to the 
extent of his interest.~· 
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See -±8 C.J.S., Page 930, paragraph 6 under Joint 
Tenancy which reads in part as follows: 
"The shares or interests of joint tenants arP 
presumed to be equal, although the contrary llla~' 
be shown h~· proof." 
Thmnpson on Real Propert~·, Y ol. 4, reads in part 
as follows: 
Para. 17'76 "Where joint tenancy exists, each 
tenant has an undivided nwiety of the whole ... " 
Para. 1777 "According to the common law posi-
tion it was essential that for an estate in joint 
tenancy to be created or to continue to exist there 
must be 'four unities,' (a) there 1nust be a unity 
of interest, that the tenants n1ust have one and 
the same interests, ... Pnity of interest requires 
that the shares of the joint tenants, whatever be 
their number shall be equal. ... '' 
Unity of interest has unifonnly been held to be one 
of the characteristics of a joint tenancy. The following 
statements from representative cases should be adequate 
to establish this point: 
Paluszek v. Wohlrab, an Illinois case reported in 
115 N.E. 2d 764 1nakes it clear that the interest of joint 
tenants would be an undivided one-half in each where 
there are only h\·o joint tenants in the following words: 
''This argu1nent is without foundation. The 
unity of interest n•quired for the creation of a 
joint tenmw~· n--fers to equality among the co-
tenants only as to tlwir interest in the P~tatP. 
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'l'hu:-; a dPPd g-ranting one tenant an estate for 
lit'P and thP otht>r an estate for years cannot 
crPatP a joint tPJuuwy. Nor can one tenant be 
•rJ·antPd a one-fourth interest and the other a 
tlll't'P-I'ourths interest. So, also, when a joint 
tPmuwy ha~ be<·n esatblished, each tenant is re-
gard.Pd a~ having an equal interest in the entire 
~·~tatP. Tiffany, Real Property, sec. 418, 3d Ed. 
In neithPr <"Hi'iP does unity of interest relate to an 
equality in the eontribution of purchase 1noney." 
~t't' Duncan L:. :i!lh!J, 37 N.E. 2d, 826 (Ill.) in which 
l'lt~t' the Court said in part: 
"One of the essential characteristics of a 
joint tenancy is a unity of interest which requires 
that the shares of the joint tenants be equal ... " 
.l!agucr r. .l/w;liFt, 100 N.E. 2d, 344 (Ill.) in which 
tlw court said in part as follows: 
"The 1neans chosen was the creation of a 
joint tenancy. This carried with it not only the 
right of survivorship, which is the essential 
eharacteristir of joint tenancy, but gave him an 
undivided one-half interest equally with the wife. 
Duncan Y. Suhy, 378 Ill. 104, 110, 37 N.E. 2d 
S:2ti: -1-S C.J.S., Joint Tenancy, §1, page 910." 
Clt'arer 1'. Long, 126 X.E. 2d, 479 (Ohio), which the 
court said in part: 
"l~nder the conunon law it has been said that 
to create a joint tenancy the four unities of inter-
est, tilne, title and possession n1ust be present. 
The eounnon law rule indicates that all tenants 
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must have the same interest in the land in respect 
to the duration of the estate." 
In Clausen v. Warner, 78 N.E. 2d, 551 (Ind.), the 
court said: 
''Joint tenants hold 'by the half and by the 
whole.' They n1ay dispose of their individual in-
terests during their lives but if they fail to do 
so the entire go_es to the survivor. 1-1 Am. Jur., 
§§ 6 to 14, pp. 79 to 87. But neither can dispose 
of the interest of the other. 1-! Am. Jur., § 84, 
p. 148. In the instant case the decedent was with-
out power to dispose of appellant's one-half in-
terest in the funds on deposit." 
In Re: Suter's Estate, Strail v. Sprague, 179 N.E. 
310 (N.Y.), the court said: 
"Decedent and claimant becmne joint owners 
of the entire deposit. The incident of the right 
of survivorship is a characteristic of joint ten-
ancy but a joint tenancy may be terminated or 
severed before such right accrues by the act of 
either joint tenant. A joint tenant, as an incident 
to his tenure, 1nay always terminate the joint 
tenancy by transfer or conveyance of his interest. 
(cases cited.) Decedent and claimant each had 
the right as a joint owner of the bank deposit 
to withdraw a moiety or less than a moiety for 
her own use, and thus destro~r the. joint tenancy 
as to ~neh withdrawals." 
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In Stork r. Coker, l~D P.~d. 390 (Calif.), the court 
~uid: 
"Om· or the ehara<:teri~tie~ of joint tenancy 
i~ t ht• Pqual i ty of int('r<'~t hPld h~· the respective 
tenants ... " 
~~·~·abo Jll'ullitJh r. HcuuirJh, 309 P.2d, 1022 (:Jlont.). 
L II ()(I r .... ·n II /' 0 r: 11 is' ~-!~ p .:2d, 807 ( Kan.)' the court 
=-tat I'lL: 
"Tlw four e~st~ntial elernnts of a joint tenancy 
an· unit~· of interest, title, tirne and possession. 
rro lllePt these require1nents, the several tenants 
nm~t han• one and the sarne interest accruing by 
onP and the same conveyance cornrnencing at the 
~nnw time and held by one and the same undivided 
possession." 
ln Ron·crdink ·c. Carothe'r:), 5-! N.\Y. 2d 715 (Mich.), 
the court said: 
"ln Schulz v. Brohl, 116 ::\lich. 603, 7-! N.\V. 
101:2, the grantees are 'Peter Brohl and Christina 
Schulz ... to the1n and the survivor of then1.' 
\Ye eonstrued the deed, 116 l\Iich. at page 605, 
704: X.\Y. at page 1012, 'to convey a Inoiety to 
Pach of these parties for life with the rernainder 
to (the ~urvivor) in fee.' " 
Klcenwnn r. Shcridau, 256 P.2d 553 (Ariz.), the 
l'llllrt ~aid: 
. it will perhaps be pertinent to briefly 
recount the con11non-law e~sentials to create a 
joint tenancy. They are unity of tirne, unity of 
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title, unity of interest, unity of possession ... 
"Another characteristic of joint tenancy is 
that it is not testamentary but 'is a present estatP 
in which both joint tenants are seized in tlw case 
of real estate, and possession in case of personal 
property, per Iny et per tout,' that is, such joint 
tenant is seized by the half as well as by the 
whole." 
Hammolld 1) • .LllcArthuT, 175 P.2d 924, (Calif.), tlw 
court said: 
''A joint tenancy is a joint interest owned by 
h\·o or Inore persons in equal shares." 
Even the share of tenants in connnon is presumed 
to be equal where the contrary does not appear. SPt> 
86 C.J.S. page 378, rrenancy in Connnon paragraph 18, 
which reads in part as follows : 
"Where a conveyance to two or more p(Jrsons 
is silent as to the interest of each, their interests 
are presumed to be equal, but the presumption 
is rebuttable ... " 
\Vhether defendants owned the property as joint ten-
ants or as tenants in connnon at the time judgment was 
entered is immaterial. In either event each owned an 
undivided one-half 
A joint tenaney may be tenninated or severed by 
any act which destroys one or 1nore of its unities whether 
by voluntary act of one or all of the joint tenants or by 
operation of law, such as by a sheriff's sale and the 
one joint tenant's interest may be administered in bank-
rupte~·. ±8 C .. J .S., paragraph +, Joint Tenants, at page 
9~1. 
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~I illPr Y • .\langu~, ()3 ~.Ct. l~:2. 317 F.S. 17S, 
S7 L.t~:d. HiD ( low<'r <·ou rt <·a~P reported in 125 
t~':2d, ~lilt), Klajlmr Y. 1\]ajbar, 9-1: X.E. 2d 50:2 
(lll.) . 
.Appli<·ation of Hau~-r·~ Collection Co., 196 
P.:2d so:; \ Calif.J, Trne:· Collins Trust Co. v. 
(;nPitz. ~) l~.:2d :~;)0, 301 P.:2d 1086. 
I>Pf<·tHlnnt J{.px H. Cox ~PYPl'<'d the joint tenancy 
wht•n lw agn'Pd to ~Pll the property presu1nably without 
hi:-; wifl' joining. And thus it appears that defendant~ 
'' <'l'<' tt·nant ~ in common when the judgment ,,·as entered. 
l\•rtuinl:·. aftPr tht> order conveying the undivided one-
lmlf inhorP~t of defendant Rex H. Cox to the plaintiff the 
dt•l't•ntlant \\"ilmina Cox lwcamP a tenant in conunon with 
tlw plaintiff. 
POINT III 
WHERE PART OF A JUDGMENT IS VOID THE RE-
:\IAI~DER OF THE JUDGMENT STANDS AND MAY 
BE ENFORCED. 
\Vhere a part of a judgment is void (or has been set 
a~idP) the rPmainder of thP judgment stands and may 
ht> enforred. ~l'P () pcuslunr r. 0 pcnslwzr, SO Utah 9, 1:2 
P.~d :~l)-1-, where tlw rourt said in part: 
"Siw·t· the cost bill was not filed in ti1ne, the 
indn~ion in the judg1nent of the an10unt clain1ed 
in the bill render~ the judg1nent to that extent 
rontrary to law. It should be mnended by striking 
out thP cos b." 
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See Occiclelltal Life I Jtsura llcc Co. t:. ill icndor(, J.l. 
P.2d 1099 (Ida.) in \vhid1 the court said: 
"It has been held by this court that if the 
judgment is void in part, and such void portion 
can be separated frmn tlH' balance, relief may 
be granted to that extent. In such case the void 
portion will be vacated and the balance will lw 
pern1itted to stand." 
See also .Allen v. Gan1er7 (45 lTtah 39) 14-3 P. 22S 
in which the court said in part as follows: 
"The fact that the judg1nent is also personal 
in form in no way effects the validity of that 
portion to which we have referred." 
See Bishop v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles 
County7 et al. 209 P. 1012 (Calif.). The court said in part: 
"That exception is that where the rights and 
interests of the defendants are distinct, an order 
setting aside a judg1nent against one will not 
affect the judgment against a co-defendant." 
See also Blalock v. Riser, 354 S.W. 2d 134 
('T·exas), Bank of Greenville v. S. T. Lowery & 
Co., 90 S.E. 390 (\Y. Ya.), Hunt v. Ramsey, 345 
S. W. 2d 260 (Texas) and J mnes v. Handley, 101 
S.2d 7(i (Ala.). 
A~ sl't forth above, each defendant owned an un-
divided one-half interP~t whether as joint tenants as 
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titlt· wn:-; originally n·<·Pived or as tenants in co1n1non. 
This int1•1'P~t i~ clearly diYisible. Each defendant had a. 
one-half intPn·~t in tht> ttlOilt'~· judguwnt. See Duncw1 
,., S 11 hy, :ri ~.1~:. :2d ~:.W (Ill.), wherein the court said 
in pnrt: 
"The provision that in case the property was 
:-;old each should share equally in the proceeds, 
lllPI'PlY a<·eonbi with the rights of each on the sale 
of pn.)pt>rty held in joint tenancy." 
~~·~·abo J>uuu . ..,·llku c. Pauushka, 349 P.2d 450 (Ore.). 
Thi~ inYolved an estate by the entireties which is not 
tht> same as a joint tenancy but is similar in effect in 
~Ollll' n·~lH'd~. The court stated in part as follows: 
"A~ a general rule when an estate by the 
entireties is sold by a husband and wife in the 
absence of an agreement directing a contrary 
division, 'the proceeds of the sale of real property 
acquired by then1 under the smne conveyance 
belong one half to each.' " 
The ea~e of H'ilk v. Vencill, 180 P.2d 351 (Calif.) 
appears to be very simliar to the case at hand. The 
l'onrt ~tated in part: 
.. ~Ir. Y encill contends that if his wife is suc-
cessful in her defense on the statute of frauds, 
he cannot be held to the contract on the ground 
that where one of two joint tenants contracts to 
sell real estate and the other joint tenant does 
not exerute tlw contnwt, the party executing the 
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agreement cannot be compelled to cony(·~· hi~ own 
undivided interest since he contracted to sell tlw 
entire property and not simply his undivided 
interest therein. Assu1ning that plaintiff eannot 
sustain his burden of proof as against ~Irs. \'(•n-
vill, it does not follow that plaintiff's complaint 
against her husband Inust be dismissed. One joint 
tenant 1nay dispose of his interest without the 
consent of the other. Further, a party may agret~ 
to convey nwre than he possesses and, although 
he cannot fully perfonn, specific performance 
Inay be available insofar as it is possible.'' (ea~('~ 
cited) 
The lower court did exactly as suggested in the last 
sentence, "although he cannot fully perform, specific 
performance may be available insofar as it is possible," 
Wilk v. Vencill, supra, and defendant Rex H. Cox was 
tendered the full mnount pertaining to his undivided 
one-half interest amounting to the srun of $21,000.00. 
The :fen1aining $21,000.00 or such larger sum as may be 
determined by the trial court will be paid to Wilmina 
Cox for her undivided one-half interest upon final judg-
ment in the portion of this suit still pending as against 
her. 
CONCLUSION 
The order complained of by defendant-appellant 
1nerely carries into effect that portion of the original 
judg1nent that pertained to defendant Rex H. Cox by 
conveying his undivided one-half interest in subject 
prorwrt~' "·hi<·h was Pxaetly what ht> wa~ requirPd to 
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t·onvt·y from tht• beginning and for this he received hi~ 
full share of the money judg1nent or $21,000.00 which 
was all hP eould clai1n under the original judginent. The 
onlt·r of tht• lowPr ('Ott rt 1nerely carried jnto effect the 
jud~IIH'Ilt that l'(llllained after setting aside that portion 
pt'l'hl.ining to the defendant \rihnina Cox. 
Tlw ordt•r of the lower court entered under date of 
tldoht•r :!:~. 1963 ~hould be affinned. 
Respectfully sub1nitted, 
l\1ciCAY AND BURTON and 
REED H. RICHARDS 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
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